Philosophy and Psychology

About form as defence mechanism 

Abstract. The concept of form can be comprehended as shape, pattern, or the same mode. One of definitions would be: Abstracted (common) element of different contents. Form is subject of various conceptions of behavioural theories: sexualisation of thought, archetypes, proto-mental phenomena, sense of containing in object’s triad, or for instance Lacan’s formalizations. Distinctively, the forms of thought process are area of research of logic/philosophy. The work demonstrates applicability of Kant’s “categories of understanding” to some psychoanalytical concepts, such as archaic thought and defence mechanisms. The main thesis is that fulfilling the forms of thought (forms of concept, proposition and conclusion), independently of the content, has as its consequence a sensation of truth which is found in the basis of prejudices, beliefs and delusions. This comparative approach confirmed the fact of small quantitative differences, and attenuates the border of normal-psychopathology spectrum: truth, conviction, intuition vs. prejudices, beliefs, delusions.      

Key words: form; defence mechanisms; archaic thought; dialectics    

The concept of form can be comprehended as shape, pattern, or the same mode. One of definitions would be: Abstracted (common) element of different contents. Lastly, form is equal to an act of singular conceptualizing (to creation of a concept), but as a higher model of conception, it requires synthesis, the search for connections of different conceptual contents. That a concept can be represented by form is seen from its definition as the thought about essential characteristics of what is thought of. If, for example, we take the concept of man, what is common to all men would represent the form. The form of the concept man (as the common element to all men) is in opposition to the dissimilarity of each individual human being as a sensory/visual appearance (phenomenon). As Plato’s idealism emphasized the priority of idea – form in contrast to phenomenon, Kant (1790) likewise based his theory of aesthetics on this principle. In contrast to psychoanalytical principles: the beautiful as the source in sexual feelings, e.g. Freud’s (1930) indication on the character of beauty and its source in secondary gender characteristics; or the beautiful as the source in narcissistic emotions, e.g. Kohut’s (1971) child’s idealization of the parent’s imago; for Kant (1790), the beautiful has an exclusive origin in reason and represents that which is easily subsumed under a certain concept, i.e. its form (schema). In the example of the concept of man this does not only include averageness in the sense of body weight, height, but also characteristics such as individuality, specific patterns of behaviour and similar. Let us take a more extreme example: The man who does evil and only evil the whole life long, and the man who sometimes does good and sometimes evil. Although in many people it would evoke repulsion, the aesthetic value of the first man would, in accordance with the stated principle, be greater and could most simply be expressed as consistency. Unsubsumable characteristic of good and evil under the common concept man has its origin in the fact that good and evil, as well as some other concepts such as tall and short, belong to contrary (opposite) concepts. Opposite concepts are represented spatially as on diametrically opposite sides. This makes subsuming under a common concept harder, reducing its aesthetic value.   

More complex than the form of the concept would be forms of proposition/judgment and conclusion. Kant (1781) distinguishes three levels of cognition: reason in a narrow sense (conceptualizing- creation of concepts), understanding (judgment) and reason (concluding). In contrast to the form of concept, which is phenomenologically harder to represent, forms of proposition and conclusion are represented by logic.      

Propositions/judgments are defined as connections between concepts. On the basis of cognitive differences, Kant (1781) distinguishes two main kinds of proposition: analytic and synthetic. According to Kant (1781), analytic proposition: All bodies are extended, doesn’t have a great epistemological value because the concept bodily already contains the element of spatiality as its important characteristic. As an example of a cognitive synthetic proposition Kant (1781) presents the proposition: All bodies are heavy, where the predicate heavy has its origin outside the representation of the specified concept, that is, in experience.   

Taking the epistemological value into consideration as well, logic distinguishes propositions by quantity, quality, modality and relation. Because of the importance for further discussion, only some classes of proposition and their forms will be presented:

All professors are absent-minded; the form of these propositions would be All S are P

Some birds are song-birds; Some S are P

Peter is a bad pupil; S equals P

The dog is not the cat; S is different from P

Everything animate must die; S necessarily/certainly P

Categorical (unconditional)

The whale is a mammal; S P

If it rains, the streets are wet; If SP, then CD

He is either mad or genius; S is either P1 or P2.

Although Kant (1781) places the greatest importance on the forms of conclusion, because of the scope which would exceed the boundaries of the presented work, and for the purpose of clarification of particular work theses, the form of incomplete inductive conclusion is presented:

S1 is P

S2 is P

S3 is P

...

Sn is P

S1, S2, S3 ... Sn are some S

____________

All S are P.

Logicians have long ago indicated the existence of difference between validity (formal truth) and objective truth of propositions and conclusions. In contrast to objective truth, formal truth is independent of the content, that is, of the truth of elements of proposition. The main thesis of this work is that fulfilling the forms of thought (forms of concept, proposition and conclusion), independently of the content, has as its consequence a sensation of truth which is found in the basis of prejudices, beliefs and delusions. It is precisely the inexistence of a qualitative difference in the apperception of sensation of truth (formal and objective) that results in dialectics of reason (speculation vs. objectivity).  

It can be seen from the presented logical propositions that form can be qualitatively and quantitatively different. The highest form would be “universal form” which includes: generalization, equality, necessity, and unconditional quality (Kant, 1781). This form Kant recognizes in almighty God as an example of unconditional, universal causality and necessity for all events to be. He notices the same phenomenon in both the form of natural laws and the morality as well, where morality is seen as a priori inherent in our reason (Kant, 1785; 1788).

As an example of a natural law let us present the Law of Gravity. This law holds for all phenomena that have mass. Under the same specific conditions it holds equally for all bodies. It holds necessarily for no body is free from its influence. The form of unconditionality in the case of the Law of Gravity holds more than in the case of other laws since the gravitational field (space-time) represents the necessary condition – a scene for the presence (existence) of all other phenomena and their laws (Einstein, 1916). The only thing which, in accordance with today’s conceptions of physics and theory of gravitation, restricts this unconditionality is the description of the beginning of time (Big Bang).

In the case of morality the same principles apply. Moral Law is equal for all men (inherent to all beings that have reason). It holds necessarily. Kant (1788) points out that Moral Law does not advise, but commands. And for an act/practice to be in accordance with Moral Law it has to be unconditioned – disinterested (Zizek, 1998). For a principle to be moral, it has to satisfy the condition of universality. To lie, for example, can’t be a universal principle even if all people agree to lie to each other. Although we lie to each other, we don’t lie to ourselves whereby each unit excludes itself from the universal set. Hence the stated and agreed principle can’t be universal since it ends in contradiction to universal form. As an ideal subject of the practical reason which satisfies the universal form Kant (1788) states good.

Relating Kantian morality and Freud’s psychoanalytical concepts common element emerges: God = Morality. Morality of “Kantian God” arises from a priori (given) rules of our reason functioning, while “Freud’s God” derives from drive-sentiment satiation. God is in each case a phantasm. Wish fulfilment! It is a wish of our reason to achieve universal form (Kant), or a wish to attenuate empirical- emotional deprivations (Freud). Freud has placed Kant’s categorical imperative into Super-Ego (Roudinesco and Plon, 1997). Freud’s ethics in this case is not a categorical imperative as it is conditioned. It is conditioned by the castration anxiety, fear from losing the object of love, or by narcissistic satiation tendency of Ego-ideal. Surely in Freud’s theories the representation of God can’t be completely separated from reason, but that drive-sentiment factors play an important part can be seen from Freud’s (1930) claim that the need for religion arises from the child’s feeling of helplessness which evokes yearning for father. Kant’s methodological priority of religion in reason (and not in impulses and emotions) is seen in the postulates of practical reason: Immortality of the Soul and God, which are conditiones sine quibus non for achieving absolute good, thus creating a phantasm: immortality-good (Kant, 1788). By Kant only through immortality we can achieve absolute moral virtue and good. In psychoanalytical context, this would mean a complete deletion of aggressive-sexual components and their derivatives in conscious thought. By the aid of analytic technique, reason approximates this human perfection (Tauber, 2009). Fenichel (1945), in his chapter on the classification of instincts and the critique of the concept of death-drive, expresses the view that it is unsustainable to expect that Ego has inherently different impulses form those present in Id, as well as that all events outside the principle of satisfaction (self-destructive principles) are caused by external forces that disturb principles inherent to organism. If we accept Freud’s interpretation that an important characteristic of libido is subordination of object by subject, than this “reductionism” is in direct opposition to Kant’s morality-universality which is inherent to the nature of human reason. Out of all natural beings, human being is conflicted the most. HOMO DIALECTICUM! The conflict of motives can stem out of incompatibility, antagonism of drives (drive for self-preservation and drive for continuation of species), antagonism of emotions (love and hate), and antagonism of reason. It is certain that some life forms experience antagonism only related to clash of self-preservation and protection of the offspring, considering that they do not focus their care toward object that satisfy their sexual urges. Further, irradiation of love to sexual partner “complicates matters”, and even more so when love irradiates to entire herd. When it comes to Homo sapiens, the situation is “made worse” with the reason’s tendency toward equality and universal equilibrium. Conflict/dialectics of drive-sentiment and reason is inherent to human nature. One of implications of this view is that in the case of prevailing of autonomy of the body (caused by inability to control aggression) the phantasm of reason immortality-good, justifies suicide dynamic “murdering oneself not to murder other” (Roudinesco and Plon, 1997). Kant (1785) points out that suicide steps out of the frame of universality-morality, because to put an end to life means to undermine general law of nature. Taking into consideration Kant’s (1788) claim that man belongs not only to the world of phenomena but to the world of noumenon (intelligible world) as well, cessation of “earthly life” is not necessarily cessation of life. Perhaps Christian and other religions intuitively sense this possibility and consequence of reason and therefore emphasize in their sermons the taboo of suicide.  

Even though, there was animosity within the historical materialism between rationalists of philosophical and those of psychoanalytical (psychosexual) orientation, the conflict appears to be illusion. I will quote:

Psychoanalysis has continued Kant’s striving toward the separation of reason and its deepest empirical components (of drive-sentiment cathexis). And what are the riches that are being wasted by the non-methodological procedures? The knowledge that we are created to do good, that we know to differentiate what is good, and what is evil. To put it in more mystical terms: God/Nature has given us the gift to execute unconditionally Universal Good! It has been suggested (in personal communication) that “Kant was a profound CRITIC of metaphysical overreaching. He did not align the Critical Philosophy with a claim of Unity, nor with the ability to execute unconditionally Universal Good.” I’ll repeat; Moral Law (Unconditional Universal Good) is a deep human need. Unfortunately, reason is not decisive factor of human behaviour. As for the “CRITIC of metaphysical overreaching”, Kant’s (1787) claim from the Preface to the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, of how he destroyed knowledge to gain room for faith, can serve as a counter-argument.

What is the significance of philosophical methodology of the form for the psychoanalytical technique? This is a question close to Frankl’s logotherapy: If a man is to be absolutely happy, he/she needs to do good unconditionally. Therefore, “the bombardment of patients” and finding ad hoc reasons for the support of the idea that doing good is based on usefulness of such actions can aggravate the existing symptoms, if those actions are committed a priori good. Though this stance prevails even when it comes to the altruistic emotions, considering that psychoeconomic aspect is based more on the satisfaction of the other, than on the satisfaction of and usefulness to oneself, only human species is capable of reaching the ultimate limit; guided by reason to the detriment of itself, even to total self-destruction. According to psychoanalytic conceptions, altruism is most often brought into connection with emotions and the principle of satisfaction or defences (Seelig, 2001). Altruism of reason is unconditioned. A man in this case does good not in order to gain satisfaction and benefit, but unconditionally because reason tells him that he should do so!

The idea of form has often been used in psychoanalytical behavioural theories. I will start with the example of sexualisation of thought (Freud, 1909b) and Jung’s archetypes, over the proto-mental phenomena (Bion, 1961) and sense of containing in object’s triad, to Lacan’s striving to formalize the totality of human behaviour. In all these instances, form is something invisible, yet understandable and what determines the behaviour. It is something that relates to different contents and what holds them together. Kant suggests the existence of different forms that serve to organize our experiences, such as time-space, and afore mentioned universal forms, all of which serve understanding. The term “experience” is not used here to indicate objectivity but to point at events in life which are interpreted by reason, in order to satisfy a priori forms of thought. Although the greatest part of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason is devoted to transcendental logic, that is, to conditions sufficient for achieving a priori objective truth, the very title of the work indicates Kant’s insight into speculative nature of the reason. Even they are represented in the chapter on transcendental logic and by their name point to objectivity; “categories/forms of understanding” belong to the nature of speculative reason as well. How else can we explain historical scientific fallacies, which in the given time were seen as absolute truths? The concept “speculative” does not fully reflect the nature of reason, as it includes the principle of will as an important characteristic. Freud’s (1895) thesis of “secondary subconscious intelligence” or the concept of “pre-reflective unconscious” (Atwood and Stolorow, 1980) can serve as an argument for the view that reason can autonomously reach not only speculative but also objective truth. The chapter on analogies of experience and postulates of empirical thought in 1781 Critique is a testimony to the extent of importance that Kant places on the speculative nature of reason. Differentiating the imaginary presentations, presentation in dream and madness from real presentations, as well as differentiating self from the world Kant (1781) grounds in trained reason – establishing objectivity. (Critique of Pure Reason. Refutation of  Idealism - Remark 1; 3). In this way Kant gets closer to psychoanalytic concepts: the concept of transfer (distortion of reality), the concept of primary narcissism (madness – undistinguishing self from the world), and Ego psychology (strengthening of reason – the principle of reality).

The example of the application of “forms of understanding” on psychoanalytical concepts can be found in the archaic- infantile thought. Even though some authors (Fenichel, 1945) argue that the magical thought does not obey the causality of phenomena, the conclusion could be the opposite. This thought could be marked as “an exceedingly-formal thought”. It is exactly in the infantile thought where one can see a priori imposition of form of causality to phenomena (Kant, 1781), that is, the human need for understanding. Logical formal truth of the conclusion: The one who lies steals too. The one who steals kills too, inferring further The one who lies kills; goes also for the infantile thought. When compared, the form of children’s conclusion used as a basis for Freud’s theory of castration complex: Somebody must have cut my penis, or Little people from the inside are nibbling my penis, will appear as no less true as the concepts of idealists who often use pure thought forms to prove their own conviction of God’s existence and verity. Here I do not deny the importance of experience (e.g. fear of rigorous father) in etiopathogenesis of psychic disorders, i.e. castration anxiety. I emphasize the importance of psycho-economics of the reason itself in the aetiology of the same. A mere view on a being without penis, by imposing of causality on phenomena and by satisfying forms of thought creates a belief/conviction in the truth of existence of castration. It is similar with the last proposition, where the sensation of child’s penis “Es beisst mich” (Freud, 1909a) serves as a premise of a formally true conclusion.   

That a reason is inseparable from cause in Kantian manner is seen in etymology and semantics of word reason: reason as a mind, and reason i.e. cause why something is happening. Debris of tendency to impose causality to phenomena in adults is seen in the concept of destiny, that everything is already predetermined. The essential difference between the infantile and grown-up thought would be limitation of factual knowledge. The infantile thought relies on visual similarities and analogies, which are the only possibility at this level as the basis for reaching conclusions. Thereby it results in so many mistakes. The testing of reality does not solely depend on experience (time), but it also depends on different instruments wherein children’s thought is deficient. The principle that the child should in the first six years go through what the civilization needs thousands of years for holds in this case too. Not only the young child is thrown into the world of control/rules of sexuality, but it is thrown into the world of technophilia. By its complexity the technological world frustrates comprehension of the child whom nature gave the conviction that everything has its cause.      

Satisfaction and children’s yearning for the explanation of the unexplained can be seen in some speculative psychoanalytical studies (Freud, 1920) or (Ferenczi, 1924) where theory of libido is being stretched to its final limits. In the chapter on division of general logic on analytics and dialectics, Kant (1781) claims that there is something seductive in the tendency to give all our comprehensions the forms of reason, regardless of truth. The aesthetics of connection of the unconnectable is testified also by some recent works that bind remote areas such as quantum physics and psychoanalysis (Gargiulo, 2010). As psychoanalysis as a scientific method should preserve the tradition of artistic, literary expression, it should also maintain the freedom of speculative thought. For it is certain that formal speculative thought, if not in general, can arise and guide to some in reality founded conceptions. As an author, I agree with Kant’s approach and the possibility of a priori synthetic truths. To achieve a priori synthetic truth, we must be introduced with large number of facts and highly analytical. Considering the epistemological satisfaction, children’s thought is more self-satisfying because it operates with large presentations, unlike the analytical (objectivised) grown-up mind which requires much more effort in order to achieve convincing synthetic truth. This epistemological satisfaction is different from classical psychoanalytic conception as repetition of the discovery of sexual pleasure in childhood (Freud, 1905). Epistemological satisfaction of reason is generated by satisfying a priori forms of thought. Kant’s (1781) a priori forms of thought, that is, natural tendency of reason toward interpretations, although in a different context, were reached by some other psychoanalytic authors as well: “... contemporary drive theory must include a third, interpretive (“epistemophilic” in Freud and Klein’s discussion) drive, see Katz (2001) and the following discussion herein. That is, it appears to be equivalent to posit the existence of metaphorical processes as inborn and to posit the existence of an interpretive drive.” (Katz, 2010 p. 125).    

In order for the philosophical concept of time/space form in psychoanalysis to become clearer, I will use neurodynamical descriptions. Take, for example, simple patellar reflex, where a strike between a patella and tuberositas tibiae causes a reflex of quadriceps muscle of the thigh and an extension of the lower leg. For this reflex to happen, higher centres of the brain are not necessary, but simultaneously with the automatized execution of this reflex, we get a higher representation and quality of it. The simplest description of that quality would be one time form appearing as a short- abruptly reaction. More complex reflexes, such as sexual reflex (e.g. of masturbative character) would not only include time, but also a specific space form (the relationship among particular body parts, or, what is more important for psychoanalysis, the original- primary place where it happened and was experienced). Just like in the previous example of reflex, a specific sensation of form is saved in the higher neural centres. If we now consider perceptual experiences, e.g. passive observation of some space or active (by imagination), which stimulate the same time-space form as presented sexual reflex, through already established neural links, the expansion of highly intensive perceptual irritation will indirectly cause stimulation of the sexual reflex. Mnemotechnically expressed:         

A couple of psychoanalytical examples will serve me as arguments:

-          Why some persons consider a bathroom to be the most important room in a house and why they aspire to spend a large portion of their time there: A place of a first masturbation act/phantasm (stimulation of the primal masturbation feeling by the bath taking time-space form). 

-          An example of a patient who felt special pleasure while watching a scenery where a natural form of two laterally extended hills (similar to legs) with the dense forest growth in the middle protruding region (mons pubis Veneris) and murmur of the nearby river, have stimulated the form of unconscious phantasm: being in the mother’s private area (space) during her urination (sound/frequency- time).      

-          Freud’s sexualisation of thought, where thinking ruminations imitate time-pace form of spinning in a circle of masturbation act or erogenous chewing.  

-          Fenichel’s (1945) example, where a patient is being relaxed in the house next to the railway station till the last moment, and when the train is about to leave, he runs frantically in order to catch it (time-space imitation of faecal retention and going to toilet).

In these examples patients choose or imitate activities which in their form most closely resemble the form of sexuality. Since sexuality is repressed, time/space form becomes the main element which enables substitution (as a defence mechanism). As by the form these listed activities lead to sexual satiation (drive-discharge), the form makes sublimation possible. 

“Hyperformalism” of reason can be observed in the schizophrenics’ thought and their tendency to generalize (Matte-Blanco, 1975), where judgment/explanation: All people by nature are evil, as attenuation of one’s own aggression and a cause of introversion, is not far from the truth. According to psychoanalytical concepts, people in their nature are evil, but it doesn’t mean that they necessarily act like this. Reorganization of thoughts of uncertain content into forms (of judgment) results in emphasis/conviction of their truth. Let the reader take for instance two concepts (people and closet), and judgment: All people are closets. One could ask himself: How is that possible? Where is the logic there, and than he/she will try to find similarity to explain it. What is important is that he/she suspects and senses (vaguely) the truth of the conceived judgment. The formal truth i.e. a priori conviction of schizophrenic patient that “all people by nature are evil” as a defence mechanism reduces narcissistic dissatisfaction and justifies aggression felt by the patient (I am not a degenerate. Others are aggressive too). The patient who said this proposition belongs by its characteristics under the ICD-10 to the group of Paranoid Schizophrenia with religious ideas. He was overwhelmed with conviction in the world’s evil, that all people are obsessed by devils etc.  

Katz (2010) states as characteristics inherent to human nature, besides interpretative drive, the ability to generate propositions (on the basis of similarity) and the ability to make generalizations. That generalization is a necessary condition for any thought (speculative or objective) can be seen during the formation of universal (distributed) concepts. Let us go back to earlier mentioned concept of man. This concept in the sense of quantity includes characteristics common to all men. Experientially taken, we can’t get to know all people in order to create the concept of man, but on the basis of a lesser sample and their characteristics we make generalization and accept it with apodictic certainty. In conceptualizing universal concepts the same form as the form of inductive conclusion (All S are P) is used. From the point of view of the principle of multiple function (Waelder, 1936), generalization saves energy and enables performance of more complex processes of thought. On the other hand, attractiveness of universal concepts/propositions stems from the fact that they have great epistemic value and satisfaction. Hence the tendency toward holistic scientific models or that which today’s physics calls the Theory of Everything.

Matte-Blanco’s (1975) Bi-logic could in this context be reformulated so that to the conscious here corresponds transcendental (objective) logic, and to the unconscious formal logic. This approach is closer to Lacan’s structuralisation of the unconscious, i.e., that unconscious is not archaic but structured subtly like language. As the manifest dream is in its content lesser in comparison to latent content, the dream work would essentially represent synthetic function of reason. Also, condensation represents synthetic function (reclassification of two concepts under one common– higher concept), while the displacement would correspond to analytic processes (division of concept and representation of the whole by means of the part).

The splitting of Ego or Object represents form (category) of exclusion of disjunctive judgment: “S(ubject) is either P(redicate)1 or P(redicate)2”; never both. Repression of aggressive-sexual components is amplifying, telling us that we are the other: Kantian a priori true Good, satisfying our need for moral virtue. The form of disjunctive proposition is particularly suitable for contrary concepts, e.g. good and evil. As mentioned earlier, contrary concepts are represented spatially on diametrically opposite sides, which makes a priori subsuming under the higher common concept such as the concept man harder, forcing it to split. Take the propositions:

1. Man is either good or evil. Exclusively disjunctive proposition: subject is only one.

2. Man is good or evil. Inclusively disjunctive proposition: subject can be predicate1; predicate2; both.

3. Man is good and evil. Conjunctive proposition: subject is both.

As it is seen, logic differentiates between exclusive (S is either P1 or P2) and inclusive (S is P1 or P2) disjunctive propositions. Since the concepts used in these propositions are contrary – opposite, reading the first two propositions does not yield intuitive insight into the difference between them. If we use contrary concepts in inclusive propositions, they become exclusive. The third proposition: Man is good and evil is an objective proposition and corresponds to experience or psychoanalytical concepts of man. The same thing becomes more obvious in more easily portrayed contrary concepts, for example:

He is either tall or short.

He is tall or short.

He is tall and short.

Contradictory character of the third proposition also reflects unsubsuming characteristic of good and evil into one. These examples of judgements of human thought depict the process which is inherent feature of our reason, and that is to split. 

Formal nature of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) patients is more than obvious. „If I marry the lady, some misfortune will befall my father” [in the next world].” The note about patient in bracket is Freud’s (Freud, 1909b p. 226). Here, the formal certainty of the consequence by anticipation/executing the conditional judgment operates not only as an act of aggression toward the father, but also as the confirmation of his existence. The form of this proposition is If AB, then CD. Kant (1781) states necessity of causality between phenomena as one of the main a priori forms. In accordance with this conception the first proposition is hypothetical but its execution necessarily leads to consequence. Certainty by which OCD patients sense the necessity of consequences of their actions could be expressed by the proposition: If it rains, the grass will grow. Freud (1909b) brings the patient’s conviction in fulfilment of the stated proposition into connection with the omnipotence of thought. As an argument for the view that a great part of quantity of this conviction stems from a priori forms we can use emphasized psycho-economics of reason in OCD patients. As for the concrete casus, psychoanalysis removed inhibitions and enabled Ernst to marry beloved lady, which strengthened his conviction in the existence of deceased father (“intelligible reality”) (Kant, 1788). The importance of a priori forms of thought in achieving satisfactory therapeutic outcome should not be belittled. Perhaps this is why this compulsive idea had an epithet of being the most favourite by the patient (Freud, 1909b). Whenever experience fails us, we flee into formal thought and find haven. Imperative that everything is correctly placed, counted and specifically thought about, in the best manner demonstrates the significance of time/space and logical forms of thought as defence mechanisms. “Arithmetic as the form of time” (Kant, 1781).              

If we accept the concept of a priori forms of thought, different questions impose themselves. Kant pointed out that forms are an important characteristic of nature of reason. Are they congenital or do they get activated during development by means of some genetic clock? The first possibility could explain Klein’s complex nature of the nursling/infant (splitting of Ego, and Object). Schizoid position becomes not only the basic position in psyche (Fairbairn, 1952), but is inherent to it, since reason by itself is prone to split. Congenital a priori conception contributes to inborn metaphorical process (Katz, 2010). Speculation? There have been other radical solutions in psychoanalysis: Jung’s archetypes, pre-empirical knowledge (Freud, 1918). If we accept congenital concept, the distinction child-grown-up is reduced. Thought is formally identical. Through development, the observing part of Ego evolves more and more methods of analysis, and in order to satisfy forms of mature logical thought, it is forced to leave old conceptions which are based on imagery resemblance and which are of no use for the testing of reality. “Repression” is than a consequence of transformation – specialization of the reason: Not seeing (recognizing) the forest for the trees. It is misunderstanding rather than a kind of psychoeconomic pressure. Other authors have also demonstrated this feature of repression: “Obviously there is no single counterforce but rather an array of defenses, the psychoanalytic metaphors, which explain the various personal and sometimes communal strategies used to not recognize, or accept, or explain, behavior or beliefs, all of which serve the purpose of unawareness. Such an approach makes more sense of Freud’s cryptic remark that at the end of analysis a patient usually affirms that he or she knew it all along.” (Gargiulo, 2010 p. 99). Psychoanalysis has discovered, understood and experienced the world of the child because it managed to execute regression of thought: from objective (scientific/transcendental) to formal (child’s) thought. More questions than answers? I will conclude with Freud’s (1918) thought from the last paragraph of Wolf Man, that psychoanalysis should take the path of heredity only after it has penetrated all the layers of what has been personally experienced. This is only a one more attempt toward that direction.  

Sincerely,

Zlatan Stojanovic, MD, PhD

University of Banja Luka, Republic of Srpska, Bosnia and Herzegovina

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